The thirty Thousand and Article the first of the Bill of Rights
Nine truths in honor of the truth that is Usurpation Day, 9 April 1792.
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*This post continues a theme from January 2013: the under-representation of women in the US House. It’s an updated excerpt from the introduction of my 2006 book, Article the first of the Bill of Rights: Constitutional representation – the forgotten story of We the People. The main update: in 2006 the US House was 16% women – today it’s 18%.
The founders approach to government was scientific. They had many ideas about how to build a new government, but they also had a lot of doubt. This led to debates on how to proceed, as revolutions are never clear. The founders attempted to build a system that would protect such rights as the (now) famous, “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” They also knew, when talking of citizens and representation, that there was no monopoly on how to define those three rights. Freedom is a deep well; it has also been aptly referred to as an abyss. Our revolutionaries certainly knew the abyss. Thirteen colonies do not revolt against their King and fight an eight-year civil war and not come to know the abyss. Those subjects-turned radical revolutionaries who took up arms against their law and the King of England, they had firsthand knowledge of how deep the well of human freedom ran – they lived it and then left us a blueprint: the US Constitution. The first time I considered constitutional representation a political issue, rather than a historical one, was in graduate school at Purdue University. Before that, when I taught high school US history classes, I recall discussing the representation ratio but dismissing it; frankly, it seemed old. Then, as a political science graduate student, I was assistanting a professor who was lecturing on the US Constitution, The Federalist Papers, and James Madison. At one point, the third clause in Article I, Section 2 entered the lecture. After class we discussed the size of a constitutional House, one based on the constitutional ratio of “one for every thirty Thousand.” The House would be huge, we agreed, but mostly we thought it impractical. That was nearly twenty years ago. Since then I began to think of the representation ratio in constitutional, and not congressional, terms. If we were to build a new Congress based on the constitutional ratio of one for every thirty Thousand, we would have a House of Representatives of 10,000 members. This would bring dozens of groups (factions) into the constitutional process and fundamentally change Congress. For example, women won the right to suffrage with the Nineteenth Amendment (1920), but have never received their right to representation according to their numbers. Women are more than 50 percent of We the People, and yet they are represented in the current House, our 113th, with 79 Representatives, or 18 percent of the representation; that is a 32 percent under-representation of women as a group. Such under-representations of We the People create profound political, and constitutional, consequences. Bryan W. Brickner Excerpt from Chapter 3:10, Oligarchy
The Book of the Is (2013) 10 In Federalist 57, the charge is found in the title of the essay: The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation. This one paints a portrait of a House of Representatives from the general population. Madison asks: “Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives?” We the People is the easy answer, but he wrote it supremely: Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. As there would be no qualification for office (“not of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession”), the people would choose a local to “confer the representative trust.” In the voice of someone who believed in conferring the representative trust, Madison anticipated the relationship between the Representative and constituent to be based on: “Duty, gratitude, interest, and ambition itself.” Again from Federalist 57: The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representatives. Today, with an approximate population of sixty thousand souls, Dubuque, Iowa would be equal to the founders’ Philadelphia. Today with 1.5 million souls, Philadelphia would warrant more than fifty federal Representatives under Constitutional Representation. Excerpt from Chapter 3:11, Oligarchy
The Book of the Is (2013) 11 The previous charge might raise some eyebrows as it looks a lot like what has happened. We can look at why Madison said this wouldn’t happen, as discussed in Federalist 58, and maybe we can see why one for every thirty Thousand is a fair and agreed upon number. In Federalist 58, Madison again places the charge to be defended in the title: “Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered.” Madison and the others saw the problem clearly and even anticipated what we now face. Here is also where we see an assumption made by the Constitutional Convention breakdown: the founders thought the large states would defend this principle. Perhaps it just hasn’t happened yet, as it probably will be the large states that will demand House augmentation. Madison: “There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter.” I see how Madison is still going to be correct; he and the others thought augmentation would take place because the general population in the larger states would demand it. If states like California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio, if they demanded constitutional representation, they would achieve it. This “peculiarity” hasn’t materialized only because the large states haven’t demanded it. Madison wrote that from the interest of the large states: “it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates.” Madison argued that if there were problems, the general population could step in by building a coalition of the constitutionally willing: Should the representatives or people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution. |
AuthorBrickner has a 1997 political science doctorate from Purdue University, cofounded Illinois NORML in 2001, and was a 2007 National NORML Cannabis Advocate Awardee. He is also publisher and coauthor of the 2011 book banned by the Illinois Department of Corrections – The Cannabis Papers: A Citizen’s Guide to Cannabinoids. Archives
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